Abstract-Fast, easy and inexpensive deployment of wireless networks has made them one of the most popular communication environments. Wireless networks are becoming ubiquitous and widely used to transfer critical information such as banking accounts, credit cards, e-mails and social network credentials. The more pervasive the wireless technology is going to be, the more important its security issue will be. The current security protocols for wireless networks have addressed the privacy and confidentiality issues, but failed to address other important security attributes such as availability and integrity (e.g. denial of service, session hijacking and MAC address spoofing attacks).
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in wireless technology have made it the most widely used communication medium, both in home and enterprise networks. The main advantages of wireless networks versus wired networks are their mobility, flexibility and inexpensive deployment and maintenance cost, especially in places that wiring is difficult. With the exponential growth in the deployment of Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN), the security issue of these networks has become a major concern for both users and providers.
The first wireless Local Area Network standard, IEEE 802.11, has been ratified in 1997 [1] . Since then, different revisions have been conducted to improve the base standard [2] . Although most of the revisions have focused on the performance, the IEEE 802.11i [3] standard was dedicated to security amendments. The first draft of IEEE 802.11i, which is known as Wi-Fi Protection Access (WPA), was offered in July 2004, to substitute the previous weak security specification, Wired Equivalent Protocol (WEP). Although the name of Wired Equivalent Protocol (WEP) implies that it is as secure as a wired connection, it has been shown to have numerous flaws and security issues. The major improvement of IEEE 802.11i was on privacy and confidentiality. Despite it has provided good mechanisms to improve privacy and confidentiality, it still does not have any protection against its availability and integrity (e.g. denial of service, session hijacking and MAC address spoofing attacks) [4] .
In this paper we present an Intrusion Detection System with high detection rate and low false alarms for wireless Local Area Network based on anomaly behavior analysis of the MAC layer. Our system focuses on detecting malicious management and control frames that threaten the availability and integrity of the wireless network. The system builds online models from the state machine transitions of the wireless Local Area Network protocol, IEEE 802.11, when it is operating normally and any significant deviation from these state machine transitions is flagged as an abnormal activity. The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follow. In section II the general behavior of the IEEE 802.11 protocol is described and rationale behind our approach is discussed. Section III presents our anomaly based approach for implementing a wireless intrusion detection system, and in Section IV, we present the experimental results and evaluation of our work. The summary of the research presented and planned future work is given in Section V.
II. IEEE 802.11 BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS IEEE 802.11 is a standard protocol for wireless Local Area Networks which has been ratified in 1997 [1] . The protocol has had several amendments during its lifetime in order to address performance and security issues. Since the IEEE 802.11 is a complicated protocol, here we just go through the related parts to our approach. According to a 2-bit type field in the protocol header, the frames in IEEE 802.11 are grouped into three different types: Data, Control and Management. Each frame group is composed of several different frames which are specified by a 4-bit Sub-type field. The data frames encapsulate the data from the top layer protocol in the payload of their frames. The control frames control the access to the wireless medium. They also provide MAC-layer reliability functions. Both data frames and control frames cooperate to deliver the data reliably from one station to another. Management frames are used to deliver some required primitive supervisory services like Authentication or Association. They are used to join or leave wireless networks and move associations from one access point to another access point. Unlike the wired networks in which the workstation can be physically authenticated and associated by just plugging it into a switch, in wireless network these services are provided virtually by using a sequence of management frames. There is an explicit state machine that is strictly followed to provide these services as shown in Figure 1 . Even though the IEEE 802.11i encrypts the data frames' payload to provide more privacy and confidentiality, the management and control frames are still unprotected, and consequently, they can be easily forged by attackers. There are many Denial of Service (DoS) attacks which use this vulnerability to disturb the protocol availability. In most of these attacks the attacker tries to disturb the normal behavior of the protocol by breaking the aforementioned state machine [5] ; not following the rules governed by the state machine. In our approach, we partially model the protocol state transition through machine learning algorithms. We use n-gram patterns which are extracted during online protocol behavior analysis. Since we observe the protocol behavior in a specific observation time window, we just validate the state transitions for that specific time interval, and do not need to keep the state for each connected Station/AccessPoint pair. This reduces significantly the overhead of our approach and makes it implementable even for large wireless networks. We will describe this approach in further detail in the next section. 
III. ANOMALY-BASED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS UNIT (BAU):
The IEEE 801.11 protocol has an explicitly defined state machine that is strictly followed to authenticate and associate a station to an Access Point (AP). Using the ngram analysis, we partially model the state machine transitions in a specific period of time, called Observation Time Window T. The n-gram analysis is a sequential behavior analysis method, which has been applied to many problems ranging from natural language processing to system call analysis. It is based on the assumption that the cause of anomaly can be localized to shorter subsequences within the actual sequence [6] . This method uses a sliding window of fixed size n to extract n-length subsequences, known as n-gram from the actual sequence.
In our protocol behavior analysis approach, we consider the frequency of a sequence of protocol transitions over the Observation Time Window T as a measure of whether or not the protocol is behaving normally. During the training phase, state transitions are represented as n-gram patterns, and their statistical properties are captured in the corresponding normal behavior model. During the testing phase the frequency of any N consecutive transitions of the protocol is computed during the Observation Time Window T and compared with the frequency of similar normal transitions that are stored in the normal behavior model. The difference between these two values specifies the anomaly distance for that n-gram pattern. A General architecture for the system is shown in Figure 2 .
Figure 2. IEEE 802.11 Behavior Analyzer Architecture

A. Semi-Supervised Training Phase
During the training phase, the BAU analyzes the sequence of frames between each Station and AccessPoint to extract the n-gram patterns per each Station/AccessPoint flow. Since IEEE 802.11 follows a state machine, it is feasible to assume that after enough training it can extract most of the possible normal patterns in the state machine transitions. To train the system based on supervised learning some labeled normal wireless traffic should be provided. Since generating a comprehensive normal traffic is somehow problematic, our training is based on semi-supervised learning. By semi-supervised we mean that the training data is not supervised, but the dataset is filtered to exclude the known attacks in order to provide the system with more pure training data sets. In addition there are several DoS attacks which flood the network with malicious frames to interrupt the protocol's operations. By analyzing the statistical properties of the transitions (e.g., frequencies of patterns) the intrusion detection system can then use this measure to detect these flooding attacks. 
B. Testing phase
In this phase, we monitor the wireless traffic to detect any deviation from the normal operations as a potential intrusion. The n-gram patterns of different wireless flows are generated in a similar way as it is described during the training phase and the frequency of each pattern is compared against the normal profile values stored in the normal transitions model. If the frequencies of observed n-gram patterns for a specific flow are significantly different from those which are stored as normal transitions model, that flow will be considered as an abnormal flow. To quantify the difference, we develop an anomaly metric for each flow as defined below. The anomaly score of a flow, a_score(flow), is calculated according to the following equations:
Where the count(ngram i ) specifies the frequency of the ngram i in the flow and the moc(ngram i ) specifies the maximum observed count for ngram i during training which is stored in the normal transitions model. The np(flow) specifies the number of normal n-gram patterns in the flow, while allp(flow) means the number of all observed patterns in that flow. Once the a_score (anomaly score) of a flow exceeds the specified threshold that flow is considered abnormal.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND EVALUATION
To evaluate the performance of our approach we performed two types of experiments. In first experiment type, we monitored the wireless traffic on two of the high traffic channels (channel 6 and channel 11) of the ECE department building at the University of Arizona. We used these two traffic sets associated with each channel, CH6 and CH11, to validate the approach by training our intrusion detection system on CH6 (channel 6) and testing it on another channel, CH11 (channel 11). The validation results have been used to measure the false positive rate.
In the second experiment we performed different type of attacks targeting the IEEE 802.11 state machine in order to observe the detection performance of the system. The testbed in this experiment consists of 2 Access Points (APs) operating at channels 3 and channel 8, respectively. These APs are configured to work with WEP and WPA security protocols. The wireless attacks used during this experiment are discussed later in this section.
A. Training Evaluation
Since generating a comprehensive normal traffic is somehow problematic, our training is based on semisupervised learning approach. To generate the normal transitions model of wireless traffic we have sniffed the wireless traffic for channel 6 (our high traffic channel) for one week and have collected around 216 million wireless frames that are stored in the CH6 dataset. The training data is not supervised, but the dataset is filtered to exclude the known attacks in order to provide the system with more pure training dataset. In the following experiments we have used 4 as the sliding window size and 10 seconds for the observation time window. The intuition behind choosing a window size of 4 is because, as it is indicated in the state machine shown in Figure 1 it regularly takes 4 transitions to have a cycle from state 1 to state 3 and again from state 3 back to state 1. The other n-gram sizes are evaluated later in the Detection Evaluation subsection. In addition the 10 second time window seems a good choice, because regularly in 10 seconds most of the wireless connection setup process is accomplished, and 10 seconds is an acceptable response time for an Intrusion Detection System (the abnormal behavior can be detected after the 10-second-time-window is processed). In this experiment the gram generator continues generating 4-grams from the monitored WiFi traffic on channel 6 until we reach the point that the new traffic does not produce any new n-gram pattern; that means we have captured almost all possible normal n-gram transitions. It was noticed that after processing of 102 million frames (the sniffed traffic in four days) there is no new 4-gram pattern that can be found in the channel 6 dataset. In this process we have developed a comprehensive normal transitions model composed of 922 4-grams. Figure 3 shows the number of observed new 4-grams per each 6 million frames.
Figure 3. Number of new observed patterns
To cross validate this profiling approach for the normal transition model that is generated from observing the traffic on channel 6, we apply this normal transition model to the traffic observed on another channel (Channel 11). Figure 4 shows the a-score distribution for the channel 11 traffic according to the generated normal transitions model on channel 6. As it indicates more than 90 percent of the normal traffic on channel 11 has a-score equal to zero according to the normal transition model generated on channel 6, and almost 100 percent has the ascore less than 10. This means if we set the a-score threshold to a value greater than 10 we will have a very small false positive rate on the channel 11. Our test results indicate that we have achieved less than 0.1 % false positive on the channel 11. This validates our believe that by comprehensively analyzing the normal transitions on any channel, that profiling model can be applicable to model other wireless channels with an acceptable false positive rate.
B. Detection Evaluation:
In this evaluation we have launched a wide range of wireless attacks against the test-bed AccessPoints to evaluate the detection capabilities of our approach. We first define the set of wireless attacks to be used in our evaluation, and then we evaluate the impact of different ngram sizes on the detection rates and false alarms. We use the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics) diagram shown in Figure 6 to quantify the detection rate corresponding to each false positive. 
1) Wireless Attack library:
To evaluate the system against a wide range of wireless attacks we have evaluated our approach to detect a group of known wireless attacks which target the IEEE 802.11 state machine. Each attack has been launched during 2 minutes against the two APs which are configured to operate on channel 3 and 8. The description of each attack is as follows. The a-score distribution for these attacks is shown in Figure 5 . Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 4 shows that the normal and attack traffic are properly distinguishable through the defined a-score (anomaly score) technique. The description of the performed attacks is as follows: Injection Test: By doing the Injection Test the attacker can determine if its wireless card can successfully inject and also determine the ping response times to the Access Point. The Injection Test provides the attacker with valuable information. Deauthentication attack: In this attack the attacker sends deauthentication frames to one or more clients who are currently associated with a particular access point.
Variations: Deauthentication Broadcast, Targeted Deauthentication
Disassociation Flood: This is a kind of Denial of Service attack through which the attacker floods the AccessPoint with disassociation frames to disassociate one or multiple clients from the network.
Variations: Disassociation Broadcast, Targeted Disassociation
Association Flood: This attack is another Denial of service attack in which attacker floods the AccessPoint with association or reassociation frames. Authentication Flood: This attack is a kind of Denial of service attack in which attacker floods the AccessPoint with authentication frames. Fake Authentication: The attacker uses the fake authentication attack to perform the two types of WEP authentication (Open System and Shared Key) to associate with the access point. The attacker uses this attack when he needs an associated MAC address. Sometimes the attacker does Deauthentication attack first to disassociate the current clients and then does the fake association, spoofing the disassociated client's MAC address. 
2) Detection Results:
To determine the effectiveness of our approach, the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve for different sizes of n-grams is depicted in Figure 6 . In this experiment the system has been trained with the Channel 6 Dataset (CH6), and has been tested against the aforementioned attack library. The system is tested with different n-gram sizes to compare their detection performance. It is predictable that by increasing the size of n-gram the detection performance of the system improves, but on the other hand the false positive rate increases at the same time. As it is shown in this experiment the 4-gram achieves the best tradeoff between the detection rate and false positive rate.
Figure 6. ROC diagram
The system shows a robust performance through the evaluation validation based on two performed experimenst.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have reviewed the IEEE 802.11 security issues and briefly reviewed anomaly detection techniques. The main contribution of this paper is that it introduces an anomaly behavioral analysis and intrusion detection system which can detect different types of attacks against IEEE 802.11 state machine with high detection rate (99.9 %) and low false alarms (0.1%). Our approach is based on a semi-supervised learning and anomaly based behavioral analysis technique that builds statistical and probabilistic metrics to characterize the normal protocol transitions over a period of time. We showed that by using n-gram patterns of size 4 we can accurately detect wireless attacks with less than 0.1% false alarms. We have also shown that our approach can detect accurately the following known attacks which target the IEEE 802.11 protocol state machine (e.g. Disassociation Flood, Deauthentication attack, Injection Test, Association Flood, Fake Authentication and Authentication Flood) with good false positive rate. We are currently developing other statistical measures that can be used to detect other types of wireless attacks. Since our approach is based on partially modeling of the protocol state machine, it can be easily adopted to other types of wireless protocols such as Zigbee, Bluetooth, etc.
